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ABSTRACT 
Flexible-term highway concessions are becoming quite popular around the world as a means 
of mitigating the traffic risk ultimately allocated to the concessionaire. The most sophisticated 
mechanism within flexible-term concession approaches is the Least Present Value of the 
Revenues (LPVR). This mechanism consists of awarding the concession to the bidder who 
offers the least present value of the revenues discounted at a discount rate fixed by the 
government in the contract. Consequently, the concession will come to an end when the 
present value of the revenues initially requested has been eventually reached. The aim of 
this paper is to evaluate the effect that the discount rate established by the government in the 
bidding terms has on the traffic-risk profile ultimately allocated to the concessionaire. To 
analyse this effect, a mathematical model is developed in order to obtain the results. I found 
that the lower the discount rate the larger will be the traffic risk allocated to the 
concessionaire. Moreover, I found that, if a maximum term is established in the contract, the 
lower the discount rate, the less skewed towards the downside will be the traffic risk profile 
allocated to the concessionaire. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Investment in public infrastructure is a key factor for promoting economic growth (Aschauer 
1989, Aghion et al. 1999). Many countries around the world are seeking new means to 
involve the private sector in managing and financing infrastructure through Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs). Three reasons lie behind this trend: first, the growing budgetary 
constraints experienced by many economies in the world, which led them to look for 
resources outside of the public budget; second, the search for greater productive efficiency in 
the provision of public goods; and third, the improvement of quality through a better 
allocation of risks and incentives (OECD 2008). 
 
One of the most common ways of implementing private participation in managing 
infrastructure is through the concession approach, which consists basically of transferring 
construction, maintenance, and operation of the infrastructure to a private consortium, in 
exchange for which that consortium receives the right to charge a user fee, for a period of 
time, fixed or variable, as contractually agreed upon in advance. Infrastructure concessions 
incorporate some features that distinguish them from other construction and maintenance 
contracts, and also from the basic asset privatization procedure (Vassallo and Gallego 2005). 
One of the major concerns regarding infrastructure concessions in the last few years is that 
of calculating how best to allocate traffic risk. On the one hand, traffic seems to depend to a 
great extent on factors that are beyond the control of both the concessionaire and the 
government. On the other hand, forecasting traffic accurately has proved to be a real 
challenge for both planners and private companies (Flyvbjerg et al. 2005; Bain and Polakovic 
2005). 
 
In addition, concession contracts that fully allocate traffic risk to the concessionaire seem to 
be particularly prone to renegotiation. Based on the case study of highway concessions in 
Spain, Baeza and Vassallo (2009) show how concessionaires tend to put pressure on the 
government to renegotiate concession contracts when the real traffic turns out to be lower 
than originally calculated by the concessionaire. As Guasch et al. (2008) points out, 
renegotiations are unfortunately quite common in concession contracts, and they are initiated 
not only by the concessionaire, but also by mutual agreement between the government and 
the concessionaire. 
 
In order to avoid future renegotiations and establish a more rational and fairer traffic risk 
allocation, many governments all around the world are introducing mechanisms to mitigate 
traffic risk in highway concessions (Vassallo 2006). One of the most interesting mechanisms 
to mitigate traffic risk is the establishment of flexible term contracts. The main characteristic 
of this approach is that the contract will end when a predetermined amount of accumulated 
revenues, as fixed by the terms of the contract, is ultimately reached. 
 
The most sophisticated approach within the range of flexible term mechanisms is the “Least 
Present Value of the Revenues” (LPVR) mechanism, which has been developed and studied 
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in detail by Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (1997, 2001). This approach introduces a discount 
rate to calculate the accumulated revenues. Even though this mechanism has been very well 
received by academics, its practical implementation has been infrequent, mostly because of 
the strong opposition to LPVR by concessionaires (Vassallo 2006). 
 
This paper discusses the influence that the LPVR discount rate β, which is established by the 
government in the contract, has on the calculation of the traffic risk that is ultimately allocated 
to the concessionaire. In the first section of the paper, after the introduction, I describe the 
characteristics of the flexible-term concession contracts, and analyze the data on the 
implementation of this mechanism around the world. In the next section, I develop a 
mathematical model intended to estimate the sensitiveness of the return η obtained by the 
concessionaire in terms of β for different traffic scenarios. Then, I apply the model to a 
hypothetical case study, and analyse the results derived from it. In the last section, I discuss 
the results, and then offer some concluding remarks. My chief conclusion in this paper is that 
the lower the discount rate used by the government, the higher will be the traffic risk actually 
allocated to the concessionaire. 
 
FLEXIBLE LONG-TERM CONCESSION CONTRACTS 
Theoretical Foundation 
The theoretical foundation of flexible-term concession contracts is quite straightforward. The 
idea is to tie the duration of the concession contract to the achievement of a certain goal 
previously established in the contract. One approach is to tie the concession duration to the 
number of users or to the accumulated revenues obtained by the concessionaire. In other 
words, the concession contract will end when a certain number of vehicles have used the 
highway or when the concessionaire has received a certain amount of revenues from the 
users. Consequently, if traffic ultimately turns out to be higher than expected, the duration of 
the concession contract will be reduced from what had originally been estimated. And the 
reverse is also true. In cases where the actual traffic turns out to be lower than what had 
been estimated, the concession contract will be extended. 
 
This approach means a substantial mitigation of the traffic risk that is actually allocated to the 
concessionaire compared to fixed term contracts. However, traffic risk is not fully mitigated 
by using this approach for two reasons. First, the maintenance and operation costs 
accumulated throughout the life of the contract become larger for the concessionaire when 
the concession contract becomes longer and viceversa. And second, the revenues obtained 
at the beginning of the contract will have a higher value for the concessionaire than those 
obtained at the end of the contract. As a consequence of these two issues, if in the end the 
actual traffic is higher than expected, the return obtained by the concessionaire will be a little 
bit higher than the return that would have been obtained with a fixed-duration contract. In the 
opposite case, when the actual traffic turns out to be lower than expected, the return 
obtained by the concessionaire will be a little bit lower. This means that the ultimate return 
will go up and down with traffic fluctuations, but not as much as it would have, in either 
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direction, if a fixed-term contract had been implemented. This traffic risk allocation profile 
makes sense from the standpoint of the theory of incentives since the concessionaire will still 
have an incentive to bring more traffic to the concession. 
 
Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (1997, 2001) made two substantial contributions to the 
approach outlined above. First, they suggested discounting the revenues at a discount rate 
set up in the contract (present value of the revenues) in order to reflect the different value 
that revenues have for the concessionaire at different times. Second, and perhaps more 
important, they proposed to use the present value of the revenues (PVR), not only as a 
means of mitigating traffic risk, but also as the key variable to tender the concession contract. 
This way, the bidder who in the end requires the least preset value of the revenues will be 
granted the concession contract. This is what Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic called the “Least 
Present Value of the Revenues” (LPVR) mechanism. 
 
Let me explain in greater detail how this mechanism works. Equation 1 shows the net 
present value estimated by one bidder attending the tender in terms of the most relevant 
variables that determine the economic balance of a concession contract. 
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Where 
 
NPV0 Net Present Value calculated in year 0 
Io: Initial investment estimated by the bidder (capital cost) 
r: Weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
n: Concession term 
pi: Price or toll in year i 
qi(pi): Actual traffic estimated by the bidder in year i depending on pi 
mi: Maintenance and operation costs estimated by the bidder in year i 
 
Each bidder will try to make his bid as competitive as possible in order to have the greatest 
chance of being awarded the concession. The most competitive bid under this restriction is 
always made when NPV0 = 0. Making equation 1 equal to zero and restating its terms, we 
obtain equation 2. 
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The left side of this equation shows the discounted costs that the bidder expects to bear in 
operating and constructing the concession for the duration n, whereas the right side shows 
the present value of the revenues (PVR) that the bidder expects to obtain along the contract 
duration. The point at which the two terms of the equation are equal means that the 
concession has covered all its costs—according to a cost of capital equal to r. 
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The auction mechanism based on the LPVR consists of granting the concession to the 
bidder that requires the lowest present value of the revenues to recover its costs. The 
concession will end when the real discounted flow of revenues reaches the level required by 
the concessionaire. If the real traffic is ultimately lower or higher than expected, the ultimate 
duration of the concession will be either extended or reduced. 
 
In the last few years, some academics have proposed slight modifications of the LPVR 
mechanisms. Nombela and de Rus (2004) proposed using the least present value of the net 
revenues (LPVNR) instead of the LPVR to procure concession contracts. Vassallo (2004) 
suggested the possibility of using short-term concession contracts of fixed duration awarded 
under the LPVR approach. Once the contract has expired, the government will pay to the 
concessionaire the difference between the LPVR requested and the LPVR obtained at the 
end of the contract. 
Practical experience around the world 
The use of flexible term concession contracts was reported for the first time in the case of the 
concession contract for the Second Severn Bridge in the United Kingdom, which was 
awarded in 1990. The length of the concession was pegged to a fixed target of “Required 
Cumulative Real Revenue” (Foice 1998). This way, a figure was established, in 1989 prices 
which, once collected from toll income, would bring the concession to an end. Another similar 
experience is the Lusoponte concession in Portugal, which was awarded at the end of the 
1990s. The concession agreement was designed so that the concession would expire no 
later than March 2028 or once a total cumulative traffic flow of 2,250 million vehicles had 
been reached (Lemos et al. 2004). 
 
Other countries have also implemented flexible-term concession approaches. The 
government of Colombia decided to move from fixed to flexible-term concession contracts at 
the end of the last decade. The first project to be awarded under this approach was the 
“Malla Vial del Valle del Cauca,” which will expire when the concessionaire reaches the 
accumulated revenues—not discounted—requested in the tender, subject to a maximum 
duration (Benavides 2008). The accumulated revenues required were also used as one of 
the key variables in the tender phase of the concession, though not the only one. From then 
on, many concession contracts have been awarded using this approach, particularly in the 
last few years. Right now, it is still too early to properly assess how this mechanism actually 
works since most of the contracts are either in the construction phase or in the first few years 
of operation. 
 
In the last few years, due to budgetary constraints, Portugal has moved from shadow toll 
concessions to real toll concessions. This fact encouraged the government to implement 
traffic risk mitigation mechanisms. For this reason, the Litoral Centro Highway in Portugal 
was awarded under the LPVR approach. The concession will come to an end when the net 
present value of the total revenues reaches €784 million, subject to a minimum period of 22 
years and a maximum period of 30 years. The concession ends after 30 years, regardless of 
whether the consortium reaches the PVR initially requested or not. Since the award of this 
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concession, however, use of the LPVR has been discontinued in Portugal owing to the 
opposition of potential concessionaires. 
 
Undoubtedly, Chile is the country where there has been the greatest experience in the 
implementation of the LPVR mechanism in the way that Engel, Fischer and Galetovic 
designed it. The Chilean Public Works Concession Law defined the possibility of using the 
sum of total revenues—discounted or not—to be required by the concessionaire as the main 
economic variable for tendering concessions. From then on, the LPVR has been used as a 
procurement mechanism in some highway and airport concessions in Chile. The bidding 
terms of the concessions awarded in Chile on the basis of the LPVR approach allowed the 
concessionaire to choose either a fixed or a variable discount rate. 
 
The first concession using LPVR in Chile, and also the most successful, was the Santiago-
Valparaiso highway (Route 68). An analysis of the procurement process of this highway can 
be found in Gómez Lobo and Hinojosa (2000). The fixed rate was set in the bidding terms as 
a risk-free rate of 6.5% plus a risk premium of 4%. The variable rate was set as the monthly 
average real risk free rate plus a 4% risk premium. Four bidders attended the tender. Three 
of them chose the fixed discount rate whereas only one of them chose the variable one. 
 
The second attempt to tender a highway concession in Chile under the LPVR mechanism 
took place at the beginning of 1999. The highway selected was the Costanera-Norte, an 
urban expressway in Santiago, which was a very risky project for several reasons. First, it 
was located in an urban area, thus competing with other roads and means of transportation. 
Second, part of the highway was built on a subterranean level. And third, there was public 
opposition to the project by residents of some city neighborhoods. Only one consortium 
presented an offer and it was ultimately disqualified because the guarantee bond offered was 
below the level established in the bidding documents. This experience proved that the LPVR 
was not a magic wand, able to get very risky projects off the ground without public support. 
From then on, some road and airport projects have been awarded under the LPVR 
approach. However, in spite of the interest in this mechanism, in the last fifteen years, only 
four road concessions out of the 28 presently granted were successfully awarded under the 
LPVR. The main reason why this attractive mechanism has not been implemented more 
often in Chile, Portugal and other countries is the strong opposition from concessionaires 
(Vassallo 2006). The main reason put forth by the concessionaires to explain their opposition 
to implementation of this mechanism is that LPVR sets a cap to the upside while it does not, 
at the same time, set a floor to the downside. The downside is caused by the fact that 
concession legislations and contracts (such as the ones in Spain, Portugal and Chile) tend to 
establish a maximum duration for concession contracts. Consequently, while the duration of 
a contract can be always reduced to mitigate the upside, the necessary extension to avoid 
the downside in the case of a traffic shortfall is not guaranteed beyond the maximum contract 
duration. As Brealey, Cooper, and Habib (1996) claim, private shareholders expect a large 
upside that compensates for the possibility of losing all their capital in very risky and highly 
leveraged projects. The traffic risk profile resulting from reliance on the LPVR approach turns 
out to be just the opposite of the profile desired by would-be sponsors since the upside is 
very small while the downside remains significant. 
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THE ROLE OF THE DISCOUNT RATE 
The objective of this section is to know how the discount rate β used by the government in 
tendering a concession contract under the LPVR approach influences the return η ultimately 
achieved by the concessionaire for different traffic scenarios. To that end, in this section, a 
mathematical model is developed to relate β to η when traffic estimates turn out to be 
inaccurate. Once the model has been defined, I apply the model to a hypothetical case in 
order to visualize and assess the results. 
Definition of the model 
The net present value of a concession business is given by equation 1. This equation is 
defined in terms of discrete time units. This means that all the revenues and costs produced 
in a specific year are supposed to be concentrated at a particular point. In order to carry out 
a more thorough analysis, it is useful to express this equation on the basis of continuous time 
units by using the continuous interest formula. This way, the length of the compounding 
period is reasoned to be infinitely small. This approach will enable the model to obtain more 
accurate results in determining the ultimate length of the contract. Equation 3 is obtained by 
replacing the discrete time interest formula by the continuous time one. This way, the former 
variable i, used to refer to a discrete number of years, is replaced by the variable t, which 
refers to continuous time units. 
 
[ ] dtetcttpqtpINPV rtT −∫ ⋅−⋅+−=
0
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In order to simplify the model, I make several assumptions. First, I assume that inflation is 
either non-existent or grows at a constant rate, which enables me to use real, instead of 
nominal, monetary units from the present, and going forward. Second, I consider that the 
price or toll does not vary in real terms throughout the life of the contract, so p does not 
depend on t. This assumption is not far from the reality since most of toll road concession 
contracts incorporate price caps indexed so as to rise at the same rate as inflation. Third, I 
assume that the traffic q will no longer be influenced by p throughout the time, so under this 
assumption q will depend only on t. As p grows at the same rate as inflation, this assumption 
is sensible. 
 
In order to model traffic evolution, I assume that traffic in time t will depend only on two 
variables: the traffic q0 in the first year of operation (year 0), and the annual traffic growth α. 
For the sake of simplification I consider that α is constant throughout the lifespan of the 
concession. Consequently, the traffic volume for year t is calculated according to equation 4 
in the following way: 
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teqtq α⋅= 0)(  (4) 
 
where: 
 
q(t) Annual traffic in year t 
qo Annual traffic in year 0 (first year of operation) 
α Annual traffic growth rate 
 
Regarding the incorporation of the maintenance and operation costs in the model, I establish 
that those costs can be split into a fixed and a variable part. The fixed part does not depend 
on traffic. For instance, the concessionaire will have to cut the grass, and keep the 
embankments in good repair, irrespective of the number of vehicles that ultimately will use 
the road. The variable part will depend on the ultimate number of vehicles that will use the 
road every year. This second part mostly reflects the wear and tear of the road pavement, 
costs that will vary depending on the number and size of the vehicles that travel. Equation 5 
shows how maintenance and operation costs are modeled. 
 
t
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where: 
 
m(t) Total maintenance cost in year t 
mF Annual fixed maintenance and operation cost 
θ Variable maintenance and operation cost per vehicle 
α Annual traffic growth 
 
Introducing equations 4 and 5 in equation 3, and adopting the simplifications explained 
before, I obtain equation 6a, from which I easily obtain equation 6b. 
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Equation 6b is easy to integrate. As a result of that, I obtain equation 7, which enables me to 
calculate the net present value in terms of the variables of the model. 
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The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) obtained by the concession is the value of the discount 
rate that makes the net present value of equation 7 equal to zero. 
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The procurement mechanism based on LPVR consists in awarding the concession contract 
to the bidder who offers the least present value of the revenues—that is, the lowest value of 
the accumulated revenues discounted at a certain discount rate β established by the 
government in the contract. The rate β fixed by the government does not necessarily have to 
coincide with the WACC r estimated by each bidder. 
 
In order to win the tender, each bidder will try to offer the least present value of the revenues 
under the restriction that its expected 0NPV should be always ≥ 0. This condition is achieved 
when equation 7 is equal to 0 and consequently the weighted average cost of capital r 
estimated by each bidder coincides with the internal rate of return IRR that each bidder 
expects to attain. Making NPV0 equal to 0, we obtain equation 8, which is equivalent to 
equation 2 but using continuous time units instead of discrete time units. The left side of the 
equation shows the present value of the costs and the right side of the equation shows the 
net present value of the revenues PVR0(r). 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] )(111111 0)()(0 rPVRerqermerqI TrorTFTro =−⋅−⋅⋅=−⋅⋅+−⋅−⋅⋅+ ⋅−−⋅− αα αθαθ  (8) 
 
where: 
 
PVR0(r) Present value of the revenues discounted at r  
 
As many bidders can attend the tender, and each one of them can have different estimates 
of traffic, costs, and WACC, they can offer different present values of the revenues 
depending on their estimates. Equation 9 shows the same relationship as equation 8, but this 
time, the equation is made specific for the estimates conducted by each bidder. In equation 
9, the subscript E means “expected” and the superscript j refers to each one of the bidders. 
For instance, [ ] jEoq  means the level of traffic in year 0 expected by bidder j. I have added the 
subscript E to the variables that the bidder has to estimate in the tender (I0, q0, α, mF, θ). 
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Where 
 
)(0
jj rPVR  Present value of the revenues needed by bidder j discounted at jr   
jr    WACC estimated by bidder j [ ] jEq0    Annual traffic in year 0 expected by bidder j 
j
Eα    Annual traffic growth expected by bidder j 
j
NT    Term needed by bidder j to obtain a rate of return equal to 
jr  
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From equation 9, it is possible to calculate for each bidder the contract duration jNT  which, 
according to their estimates, would be necessary to achieve an internal rate of return (IRR) 
equal to the cost of capital jr . The period jNT  is, then, the contract duration that, according 
to the estimates of each bidder, is necessary for the bidder to achieve a rate of return jr  
equal to its cost of capital. 
 
However, as has already been mentioned, the discount rate β imposed by the government 
on the bidders for their calculation of the present value of the revenues does not have to 
coincide with the WACC jr  estimated by each bidder. Consequently the present value of the 
revenues offered by each bidder j )(0 βjPVR  does not have to coincide necessarily with the 
value )(0
jj rPVR  from equation 9. Even though the government intends to make β coincide 
with r, this is a real challenge due to asymmetrical information problems. 
 
The present value of the revenues offered by each bidder will be given by equation 10 
where, again, the subscript E means “expected” and the superscript j refers to each one of 
the bidders. 
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where: 
 
)(0 βjPVR  Present value of the revenues offered by the bidder j 
[ ]jEq0    Annual traffic in year 0 expected by the bidder j 
j
Eα    Annual traffic growth expected by the bidder j 
 
As the interaction among different bidders in the tender has now been explained, from now 
on I will focus my attention on the bidder who offers the least present value of the revenues 
and consequently will end up becoming the concessionaire. The present value of the 
revenues offered by the concessionaire will be given by equation 11, which is the same as 
equation 10 without superscript j. For the sake of simplicity, I consider that the values without 
superscript j are the values estimated by the bidder who ultimately becomes the one selected 
to be the concessionaire. Equation 11 shows how the lower the discount rate adopted by the 
government in the contract, the larger will be the LPVR requested by the concessionaire. 
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The objective of this paper is to determine how the discount rate β set up by the government 
in the contract influences the final return for the concessionaire η when the ultimate traffic is 
not as expected. 
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According to the LPVR procurement mechanism, the concession will come to an end at the 
time TR when the LPVR requested is ultimately reached. This condition is shown by equation 
12. This equation is similar to equation 11, but the expected traffic variables [ ]Eq0  and Eα  
are replaced by the real traffic variables [ ]Rq0  and Rα . Consequently, the value TR that 
satisfies equation 12 will be the ultimate duration of the contract. Depending on how [ ]Rq0  
and Rα  ultimately behave compared to [ ]Eq0  and Eα  the contract duration can be either 
extended (TR>TN) or reduced (TR<TN). 
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Once the real term TR that will be determined in accordance with LPVR is calculated for 
different traffic scenarios, it is quite straightforward to estimate the net present value 
ultimately reached by the concessionaire by introducing all the real variables—including the 
value of TR previously calculated—in equation 7. This gives equation 13. The ultimate rate of 
return η obtained by the concessionaire will be the value of the discount rate η that makes 
equation 13 equal to 0 (see equation 14). 
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The goal of the model that we develop in this paper is to estimate the actual rate of return η 
obtained by the concessionaire as a function Φ of the discount rate β adopted by the 
government, for different traffic scenarios (see equation 15). 
 [ ] [ ]( )ERER qq ααβη −−Φ= ,, 00  (15) 
Results of the model 
Unfortunately, some of the equations we have developed in the previous section do not have 
an algebraic solution. For instance, it is not possible to obtain an algebraic solution for TN 
from equation 9. Similarly, it is not possible to obtain an algebraic solution to obtain η from 
equation 14. Consequently, it is not feasible to calculate in algebraic terms the derivative 
expression β∂Φ∂  that shows whether η increases or decreases with β. In spite of this, it is 
still possible to obtain a numerical solution for these equations. For this reason, we can 
assess the different solutions for different scenarios implemented in a hypothetical case 
study. This way, the lack of an algebraic solution can be circumvented. 
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To that end, I have decided to apply the model to a hypothetical case study. The 
characteristics of the hypothetical case study are based on average values of highway 
concession contracts in Spain. The variables adopted are I0= €300 millions, p=10 €/trip, 
q0=3,650 Million trips/year, α=2% annual, mF= €3 million, θ=2 €/trip, r=7.5%. In addition, the 
maximum legal duration of the concession contract is assumed to be 30 years. 
 
Moreover, in order to simplify the results, I assume that all the variables behave as expected 
except the traffic growth α. In this respect, traffic deviation is defined as αR-αE. 
 
Figure 1 graphically shows how the model behaves for two different discount rate scenarios: 
first, β=r=WACC=7.5%, and second, β=0%. The first scenario assumes that the government 
adopts a discount rate equal to the WACC of the project. The second scenario assumes that 
the government decides not to discount the revenues, as was the case for example with the 
Second Severn Bridge in the UK. The left graph within Figure 1 shows the process that the 
concessionaire would have followed in order to estimate the present value of the revenues to 
offer in the tender, according to the expected behavior of the variables of the concession. 
 
 
Figure 1: Concession duration depending on the discount rate β when annual traffic 
growth is higher than expected 
 
The dark blue line represents the evolution throughout the years of the capital, maintenance, 
and operation costs (Capex+Opex) of the concession discounted at the WACC. The pink line 
represents the evolution during the years of the accumulated present value of the revenues. 
According to equation 2, the equilibrium point of the concession will be the intersection of 
those two lines. The present value of the revenues requested by the concessionaire, if the β 
adopted by the government equals the WACC, will be €411.65 million. The expected 
duration of the concession will be 17.6 years. 
 
However, if the government decides to adopt a discount rate β equal to 0%, the curve 
representing the evolution of the accumulated revenues will be that shown in yellow. If the 
government decides not to discount the revenues, the concessionaire will require in the 
tender a level of accumulated revenues that would correspond to 17.6 years of concession, 
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which is the number of years necessary for the concessionaire to recoup its costs according 
to its cost of capital r. The amount to be required will be the intersection of the yellow line 
with the vertical line corresponding to 17.6 years. The accumulated revenues that the 
concessionaire will require for this scenario will be €770.32 million. 
 
The left graph in Figure 1 shows what would have happened if the annual traffic growth α 
had been the expected annual traffic growth plus 4% (i.e. if the annual traffic growth 
expected was 2%, the real growth would be 2%+4%=6%). In this scenario the pink revenue 
line, discounted at the WACC, and the yellow revenue line, not discounted, will be steeper 
than they were in the expected scenario due to a greater traffic increase. Moreover, the 
maintenance and operation costs throughout the years will be higher than expected since 
more vehicles will accelerate the deterioration of the infrastructure. This fact explains why the 
dark blue line is a little bit steeper in this scenario than it is in the original scenario. 
 
If the government has adopted a discount rate equal to 7.5%, the concession will expire 
when the pink line reaches the €410.65 million requested in the tender. This will occur after 
12.36 years. However, if the government has chosen not to use any discount rate (that is, a 
discount rate equal to 0), the concession will expire when the yellow line reaches the 
€770.32 million requested in the tender. This will occur after 13.64 years. The upside to be 
obtained by the concessionaire will be higher if the government does not discount the 
revenues rather than if the government chooses to discount the revenues at the WACC, 
since, for a specific traffic scenario, the ultimate rate of return η will depend only on the 
duration of the concession. 
 
Doing the same calculation for different traffic growth deviation scenarios, we obtain Figure 
2. Consequently, this Figure shows the ultimate rate of return η obtained by the 
concessionaire in terms of the discount rate β fixed by the government in the tender for 
different traffic growth deviation scenarios. The purple line shows the ultimate rate of return η 
obtained by the concessionaire when α = 0%, which means that the real traffic growth turned 
out to be exactly as expected. For this case, η will be the same regardless of the value of the 
discount rate β adopted by the government in the tender. 
 
The lines in different shades of blue show the outcome when the real traffic growth turns out 
to be higher than expected. It is notable that the lower the value of β the higher will be the 
return for the concessionaire η. I have not included in this graph the outcome when β is 
higher than the weighted average cost of capital r. This is because, when this happens, the 
higher the traffic growth, the lower will be the return obtained by the concessionaire, which 
does not make any sense from the perspective of the theory of incentives. Consequently, a 
first conclusion of this analysis is that the discount rate β used to procure a highway under 
the LPVR approach should never be higher than the WACC. 
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Figure 2. Rate of return η for the concessionaire depending on the LPVR discount rate 
β for different traffic growths 
 
The lines in different shades of orange show the outcome when the real traffic growth turns 
out to be lower than expected. In this case, the lower the discount rated β adopted by the 
government the higher will be the return η obtained by the concessionaire. However, in this 
case, we note a substantial difference. For the scenarios with large traffic deviations, the 
reduction of the return η is outstanding even for discount rates close to the WACC r. The 
reason for this behaviour is that a legal maximum term of 30 years is established in the 
contract, which limits the extension of the contract to the point where the present value of the 
revenues initially requested is ultimately achieved. This explains the uneven shape of the 
lowest of the orange-shaded curves in Figure 2. 
 
This figure graphically justifies the criticism made by the concessionaires to the LPVR 
mechanism—that the upside and the downside are not symmetric. On the one hand, the 
upside in cases of a positive deviation of the traffic growth is a little bit smaller that the 
downside that would occur when the traffic growth expected experiences the symmetric 
negative deviation. Furthermore, the maximum term of the concession contract accentuates 
the asymmetry, particularly when the discount rates adopted are close to the weighted 
average cost of capital. 
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Figure 3. Sensitiveness of the return η obtained by the concessionaire to the traffic 
growth depending on the procurement mechanism adopted 
 
Figure 3 shows the same results from a different point of view. Now the curves display the 
ultimate return η for the concessionaire in terms of the annual traffic growth deviation for 
three different procurement mechanisms adopted: first, a fixed-term contract, which is 
depicted by the curve in black; second, the LPVR mechanisms with β=0%, depicted in dark 
green, which means that the revenues are not discounted—such as was the case with the 
Second Severn Bridge Concession in the UK; and third, the LPVR mechanisms with 
β=WACC=7.5%, depicted in light green, which is basically the LPVR mechanism as it has 
been implemented in Chile. 
 
Several conclusions result from the analysis of Figure 3. First, the traffic risk allocated to the 
concessionaire in a fixed-term contract is much higher than it is in the two scenarios of 
flexible term contracts. Second, whereas 22 αη ∂∂ =0 for a fixed-term contract, 22 αη ∂∂ <0 
for flexible-term contracts based on LPVR, which means that for the same traffic growth 
deviation, the upside obtained by the concessionaire will be lower than the downside. And 
third, the downside is even more accentuated when the discount rate β approaches the value 
of the weighted average cost of capital r due to the maximum limit established for the 
contract’s duration. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This research shows that, even though LPVR is a very interesting approach in both the 
procurement of highway concessions and in the mitigation of traffic risk, there is still a lot of 
work ahead to evaluate the consequences of its application. This paper presents a first step 
in this analysis. To that end, I have developed a model that sheds some light on the effect 
that the discount rate β fixed by the government in the contract has on the traffic risk profile 
ultimately allocated to the concessionaire. The conclusions of this research could be 
extremely useful for decision makers who opt for using LPVR as a procuring mechanism to 
grant highway concessions. The conclusions are the following: 
 
• The discount rate β to be used in the LPVR should never be higher than the WACC 
estimated by the concessionaire. Otherwise, the concessionaire will not have an 
incentive to attract more traffic to the concession. 
 
• The lower the value of the discount rate β, the higher will be the traffic risk allocated to 
the concessionaire. Despite this, any kind of flexible term contract allocates much less 
traffic risk to the concessionaire than a fixed-term contract. 
 
• The establishment of a maximum concession term causes an accentuated asymmetry 
between the upside and the downside in terms of η when the concession is awarded on 
the basis of the LPVR approach. This asymmetry becomes more pronounced when the 
discount rate β adopted by the government is close to the WACC and the contract sets 
up a maximum duration for the concession. 
 
The theoretical analysis conducted in this paper demonstrates that the opposition of the 
concessionaires to the implementation of the LPVR mechanism is justified, since LPVR 
substantially limits the upside but not the downside. This effect is particularly accentuated 
when β is close to the WACC. 
 
The main policy implication of this research is that using low discount rates in the LPVR 
mechanism could have important advantages. First, the traffic risk profile allocated to the 
concessionaire is still substantially mitigated compared to using fixed-term contracts. 
Second, unlike the case in which a discount rate β close to the WACC is used, using a low 
discount rate allows the concessionaire to enjoy a certain upside if traffic eventually becomes 
higher than expected. And third, the downside caused by a maximum term established in the 
contract in case that traffic ultimately becomes lower than expected is not substantially 
different across different discount rates β. 
  
The effect of the discount rate in highway concessions awarded under the LPVR approach 
VASSALLO, José Manuel 
 
12th WCTR, July 11-15, 2010 – Lisbon, Portugal 
 
17 
REFERENCES 
Aschauer, D. (1989). “Is public expenditure productive?” Journal of Monetary Economics, 
Vol. 23 (2), 1989, pp. 177-200. 
 
Aghion, P., Caroli, E. and García-Peñalosa, C. (1999) “Inequality and economic growth: the 
perspective of the new growth theories.” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37 (4), pp. 
1615-1660. 
 
Baeza, M.A. and Vassallo, J.M. (2009) “The User’s Curse in Concession Contracts: Case 
Study of Toll Motorways in Spain.” Public Money and Management (forthcoming). 
 
Bain, R. and Polakovic, L. (2005) “Traffic Forecasting Risk Study Update 2005 through 
Ramp-up and Beyond.” European Transport Conference. Strasbourg, France. 
 
Benavides, J. (2008) Alternativas de adjudicación de proyectos de concesión vial en 
Colombia. Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público, Bogotá, Colombia. 
 
Brealey, R.A; Cooper, I.A and Habib, M.A. (1996). “Using project finance to fund 
infrastructure investment.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 9 (3), pp 25-38. 
 
Engel, E., Fischer, R. and Galetovic, A. (1997) “Highway Franchising: Pitfalls and 
Opportunities.” American Economic Review, Vol. 87 (2), pp 68-72. 
 
Engel, E., Fischer, R. and Galetovic, A. (2001) “Least Present Value of Revenue Auctions 
and Highway Franchising.” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 109 (5), pp 993-1020. 
 
Flyvbjerg, B., Skamris Holm, M.K. and Buhl, S.L. (2005) “How (In)accurate Are Demand 
Forecasts in Public Works Projects? The Case of Transportation.” Journal of the American 
Planning Association, vol. 71 (2), pp. 131-146. 
 
Foice, D. (1998). “Second Severn Crossing”. Proceedings of the Seminar PPP Risk 
Management for Big Transport Projects. Ministerio de Fomento, Spain. 
 
Gómez-Lobo, A, and Hinojosa, S. (2000). Broads Roads in a Thin Country: Infrastructure 
Concessions in Chile. Research Paper 2279, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 
 
Guasch, J.L., Laffont, J.J. and Straub, S. (2008) “Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in 
Latin America Evidence from the Water and Transport Sectors.” International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, Vol. 26. pp. 421-442. 
 
Lemos, T., Eaton, D., Betts, M and Tadeu de Almeida, L. (2004). “Risk Management in the 
Lusoponte Concession–a Case Study of the Two Bridges in Lisbon, Portugal.” International 
Journal of Project Management, Vol. 22, pp. 63-73. 
 
The effect of the discount rate in highway concessions awarded under the LPVR approach 
VASSALLO, José Manuel 
 
12th WCTR, July 11-15, 2010 – Lisbon, Portugal 
 
18 
Nombela, G. and de Rus, G. (2004) “Flexible-term Contracts for Road Franchising.” 
Transportation Research Part A, Vol. 38, pp. 163-179. 
 
OECD (2008) Transport Infrastructure Investment: Options for Efficiency. International 
Transport Forum. OECD, Paris, France. 
 
Vassallo, J.M. (2004) “Short-term infrastructure concessions: conceptual approach and 
recent applications in Spain.” Public Works Management and Policy, Vol. 8 (4), 2004, pp. 
261-270. 
 
Vassallo, J.M. (2006) “Traffic Risk Mitigation in Highway Concession Projects: the 
Experience of Chile.” Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, Vol. 40 (3), pp. 359-381. 
 
Vassallo, J.M. and Gallego, J. (2005) “Risk-sharing in the New Public Works Concession 
Law in Spain.” Transportation Research Record, Vol. 1932, pp. 1-9. 
 
